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We know little of the internal governing practices of non-state actors once in
control of territory. Some territories have witnessed the establishment of new
institutions of public goods remarkably similar to state institutions. This
article compares four armed political parties governing territory during the
Lebanese civil war. These non-state violent actors established complex
political and economic institutions and administrative structures. Despite the
wide range of ideologies and identities of these actors, they all converged in
their institutional priorities, although not in their capacities or the particular
ways of achieving those priorities. Data from interviews and the actions of
the armed political parties suggest a combination of ideology and desire for
control is causal in generating public institutions, partly attributable to the
high degree of citizen activism marking the Lebanese case.
Keywords: violent non-state actors; insurgency; state-building; civil war;
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Spaces of alternative governance outside the purview of recognized states are
increasingly being studied, particularly when under the control of violent non-state
actors. The belligerent acts of such non-state actors are well known, but with few
exceptions we know little of their governing practices and priorities once they
control territory. Some non-state groups establish little to no civic institutions;
others construct broad governance and law and order administrations, similar to
what would be expected of a state.1 Even in squatter or informal areas where no
organized group rules, locally important people take up governance and justice
tasks.2 Indeed, the plethora of institutions in areas outside the control of states has
led scholars to question the applicability of the term ‘ungoverned spaces’.3 As
Kingston observed, while anarchy was expected in weak and failing states, some
form of alternative governance often arose instead.4
The specific institutions such violent non-state rulers create are consequential
not only for the population under their control, but also for the fate of these areas
after the termination of violence and for the possibility of renewed state
sovereignty. Research into the establishment of new governance and social
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institutions by such actors has often been marginalized to the benefit of the actors’
violence, origins, and effects on the international state system. I offer a preliminary
comparative foray into delineating the governing priorities of some violent non-
state actors by analyzing the civil administrations formed by four armed groups
within a single national and temporal context. These militarized political parties
consolidated territory and established administrative and public service institutions
in Lebanon during the civil war (1975–1990).5 The comparison reveals numerous
patterns of similarities and some differences. While the diverse ideological origins
and fiscal resources of the political parties marked the specific form of the new
governance and public service institutions, the overall priorities of the armed
political parties were similar. These similarities are not explained by convergence
to or imitation of the institutions of the national state.
I first discuss explanations for the institutions developed by violent non-state
actors to interact with the population under their control, and the diverse types
and names of such actors.6 The comparison focuses on what in the Middle East
are called militias, but more comparatively can be called armed political parties. I
then introduce the major armed political parties involved in the Lebanese civil
war and describe their sources of financing, as this constitutes one explanation for
the behavior of violent non-state actors toward the ruled population. Resources
from the populace were a significant although not predominant proportion of
funding, varying by group. Subsequently, I tackle the substance of institutional
creation by these groups.7 I take each category of institution in turn and describe
the types of institutions built by the groups. Their institutional activities were
broad, and space constraints permit only a picture of the breath and type of
institutions of the differing armed political parties. The problems and incapacities
of the armed groups in service provision are likewise outside the scope of the
article; certainly, their public services could not rebuff criticisms of inefficiency
and preferential treatment. Some were worse in this regard than others. However,
the goals and services these non-state actors established and sought to provide are
clear from the comparison. I conclude with insights from the comparison and a
call for more focused, comparative research on the non-state institutions under
which a significant amount of the world’s population lives.
Violent non-state actors and their governance institutions
The category of violent non-state actors is broad and includes groups diverse as
terrorist cells, mafias, and gangs. The motivations and limitations of these
different actors vary accordingly. For comparative and analytic purposes, it is
useful to distinguish between violent non-state actors who are militarily and
hierarchically organized and those who are not, to distinguish between those with
a program for change and those without, and to seek common terms across
regions if possible.8
This article discusses politically motivated non-state actors who are




























these actors were the armed wings of political parties. They had both political
goals and a clear command structure. Many formally trained their forces, some
with training academies. In different literatures and regions, they could be termed
guerrillas, insurgents, rebels, resistance movements, or even armed social
movements. In the Middle East literature generally, and the Lebanese and Iraqi
contexts in particular, this type of armed group is overwhelmingly termed a
militia by both local scholars and area specialists. I will call these actors armed
political parties (APP), a subset of the broader violent non-state actor category, to
avoid confusion and enable cross-regional discussion.9
The use of the term militia in the Middle East signifies the armed section of a
political party, separate from the government, or simply an armed and
hierarchically organized group. In Iraq, they are called the armed militias of a
political party (milishiat musalaha al-ahzab), and the term militia pervades the
Iraqi literature. This usage is distinct from historical Anglo-American usages,
where the term indicates a citizen detachment of the state’s military or a non-state
group serving the state’s goals. Indeed, in direct opposition to historical usage in
the United States, militia in the Middle East generally refers to parties not
attached to the state.10 This use of the designation militia is found in other
contexts as well. Shultz, Farah, and Lochard define a militia as ‘a recognizable
irregular armed force operating within the territory of a weak and/or failing
state’.11 This definition is broad, encompassing armed groups variously serving
their own purposes, the furtherance of their sect, ethnic group, clan, tribe,
religion, or factional leader, and groups in the service of the state. Fairbanks
refers to such armed groups as private armies, distinct from private security
companies, in order to avoid the confusion that the term militia generates from
the Anglo-American context.12 Hills discusses the ambiguity of the word militia,
its history as a citizen-based and state-supporting actor, and its current broader
usage. She delineates three types of militias, including clan and ethnic based.13
Whatever label is used, we know little about how such violent non-state
actors govern internally or the institutions they create to interact with the
population. Groups vary in their mix of protection and predation.14 Some
territories have witnessed the establishment of new institutions for public goods
remarkably similar to state institutions; others witness only predation. Scholars
have called areas with broad governance institutions states-within-states, proto,
quasi or mini-states, or parallel governments.15 Somaliland, Eritrea, and the
Tamils’ state are prominent examples.16 While the comparison to state-creation
is common, no particular end point characterizes such violent non-state actors.17
Violent and predatory behavior can coexist with the provision of such public
goods as social services and law and order. Further, no consensus exists why
some provide services and others do not. Kasfir maintains that only a minority of
armed rebellious groups attempt to secure citizen approval and participation in
their governance.18 Certainly, public goods can only be offered once a group has
territorial control,19 and such services are subordinate to the group’s military
priorities and existence.20



























Existing explanations for the behavior of violent non-state actors who are
politically and hierarchically organized include types of resources, control,
legitimacy derived from the provision of public goods, international influence,
and ideology. Most of these explanations, with the exception of types of
resources, are implicit and not developed theoretically. Some types of resources,
in the hands of violent non-state actors, are more likely to be looted and generate
predatory behavior than other resources.21 Lootable resources essentially
generate short time horizons for the violent non-state actor, who cares little about
investing in the populace’s future. Although predation can coexist with
institution-building and public services, in much of this literature the ability to
transfer valuables across borders easily has led authors to implicitly posit that
approval from the population is not necessary for the violent non-state actor, and
thus no desire to govern or provide public goods would exist.
Some APPs claim legitimacy in part based on service provision and
governance.22 The establishment of new public goods institutions and services can
be part of obtaining popular acquiescence or consent to the group’s rule. As Naylor
notes, even states utilize a combination of legitimacy and fear in governing. APPs
similarly combine public approval for their goals with the violent ability to
implement policies.23 One scholar defines militias as distinct from warlords
precisely by the militia’s interest in establishing public institutions.24 Linking
welfare, the military, and legitimacy is common. Military pensioners and women
were the first to receive welfare in the US, when lower classes could get no such
support, driven by the interaction of societal actors and political institutions.25 In
Latin America, social welfare, initially provided for supporters of the state, the
military, civil service, and courts, was tied to state-building and the alliances
promoting economic development. It spread later to the squeaky wheels, organized
interests such as urban sectors.26 Service provision was a form of advertising for
the mafia,27 increasing the legitimacy of drug barons. In Colombia, a drug lord won
popularity by funding extensive social projects.28 In Iraq, a vacuum of services
provided the opportunity for APPs such as the Mahdi army to secure legitimacy
and popular loyalty from their own social service provision.29
In the case of non-state actors who attempt to change society, DiPaolo
maintains that their actions imitate the state when governing territory, with the
goal of obtaining influence in the international arena. Her analysis excludes many
predatory armed actors, such as those that Reno examines, for example.30 In the
Lebanon case, the groups may have imitated the structure of the state, but not the
substance of its role in society. The APPs assumed administrative roles outwardly
similar to the state’s roles, but provided far more public goods than the state.
While they unquestionably sought legitimacy, their primary concern was
domestic and identity group legitimacy. The groups did engage in international
politics, but as an adjunct to their domestic governance.
The desire for monopolistic control can also motivate the formation of
institutions for violent non-state actors such as APPs.31 Control can encompass




























regulate their financial and violent activities, and their interactions with the
populace.33 Public institutions can also be affected by the presence of an
ideological project among the APPs. Some APPs have a model of rule, an image
of the nation and government, and a political project of identity creation to bring
it about. In the service of this political project, they could be concerned with
legitimacy and the perceptions of the population. Kingston summarizes that the
APPs that created state-like institutions had a unifying national identity ideology,
including Somaliland and Eritrea.34
The Lebanese civil war and states-within-the-state
The Lebanese civil war began in April 1975 and officially ended with the signing
of the Ta’if agreement of October 1989. Battles did not cease until a year later.
Over 100 armed groups took part at some point. Twenty were major, and only
twelve remained in existence at the end of the war.35 Most of these actors either
failed to consolidate territory and rule for significant periods, or were absorbed by
other armed groups. Four of the APPs in the Lebanese civil war established
complex political and economic institutions and administrative structures within
defined territorial enclaves under their control, de facto mini-states or cantons
within the domestic context of the Lebanese state.
Two main coalitions were initially pitted against one another in the war.
These sides devolved from advocating economic stances to promoting religious
or ethnically separate identities. They homogenized their territory and members
accordingly. The anti-status quo side, the Lebanese National Movement (LNM),
which advocated a secular political system, was leftist, somewhat socialist, and
Arab nationalist. It included the Palestinians. The other, the right-of-center
Kata’ib political party or Phalange armed group, later absorbed into the Lebanese
Forces, was overwhelmingly Christian, moderately developmentalist within a
framework of economically liberal values, and defensive of the confessionally
based status quo.36 The military coalitions at the start of the war later became a
unified hierarchical group or split apart. The Christians consolidated into one
generally unified Lebanese Forces (LF). The leftist Lebanese Nationalist
Movement (formed in 1969) split into its constituent armed groups, who became
rivals, including the Progressive Socialist Party or PSP (Druze), Amal (Shia), and
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Later Hezbollah (Shia) developed
roughly out of the same path and constituency as Amal.
The parameters of the territorial canton system were laid in the initial phase of
the war, 1975–1976. PLO institutions developed in the Lebanese refugee camps
earlier, particularly after the 1969 Cairo accord that conceded operational
autonomy within the camps to the PLO. This situation lasted until 1982 and the
Israeli invasion, when PLO forces were expelled from Lebanon. The high point of
PLO institutions in Lebanon was 1977–1982.37 The Kata’ib and then LF’s territory
from 1976 to the end of the war was East Beirut. The PSP concentrated on its Druze
base in the ChoufMountains, particularly from 1983 to the end of the war. The PSP



























also tried to develop an administration during the first phase of the war when it was
under the LNM, but failed due mainly to the plethora of groups and lack of
organization and control over them.38 Hezbollah’s territory was, and remains, the
southern suburbs of Beirut, or what is termed the Dahiyya (suburb). The
organization was established between 1982 and 1985. It formed in part in response
to consequences of the Israeli invasion of 1982 and announced itself in 1985.39
Financing the armed groups
The armed groups survived partly on funds from domestic sources of the
governed, but even more from the international arena. Natural resources were not
a factor here, although traffic and trade in some prized international goods was,
including drugs by almost all the APPs and conflict diamonds for Amal, an APP
that lacked a consolidated territory. Instead of being lootable, resources were
obtained in the service of waging war and ruling, from which APPs and
individuals amply skimmed.
As a demonstration of the resources and scope of the APPs, the PLO spent
around $300 million for its organization and constituent militarized groups, and
at the PLO’s height had an annual budget estimated to be larger than that of the
Lebanese state.40 Its standing army numbered 14,000.41 In 1982, the LF had
revenues surpassing $100 million.42 By the end of the war, the LF equaled the
size of the state’s military, with 10,000 troops, and surpassed the state in
weapons, equipment and parts, and tax resources.43 Hezbollah received about
$100 million annually from Iran until the end of the war, and the PSP, the poorest
and smallest of the bunch, had an armed force of 5000 in the mid 1980s. Its
civilian administration then employed 3000, and had a civil budget of $200
million.44 Its income in 1989 was estimated at $4.4 million.45
All the APPs taxed to varying degrees, except for Hezbollah, which instead
received religious tithes (the khums) and donations from its populace.46 All held
investments and businesses, had control over at least one of the 15ports, and charged
fees associated with the transit of goods and people in and out of their territory
through the checkpoints – in states, these would be customs duties and visa fees.
This control of all trade andmovement allowed theAPPs tomonopolizebasic goods.
Some siphoned money and arms off of the Lebanese state and international
humanitarianorganizations.All had external funders.Manyof these funding sources
necessitated coordination between the differing APPs, which occurred routinely
through direct personal networks. The cooperation among APPs, part and parcel of
what some have termed a militia economy,47 complicates theses of ethnic hatred
since groups as adversarial as the LF and the Syrians cooperated.
Although not furnishing the bulk of APP money, taxes and revenue from
domestic sources such as businesses and donations were important for the APPs,
evidenced in the amount of time and attention spent on such institutions and
relationships. Naylor determined that the LF’s system of taxation could be one of




























Restaurant bills were taxed, cinema and theater tickets assessed a fixed
percentage, industries, stores, pharmacies, bakeries, and groceries were taxed
separate amounts depending on the business volume. Fees accompanied
administrative tasks typically undertaken by the Lebanese state, such as birth and
death certificates, but which could not be completed due to the restriction of
movement. The PSP taxed businesses and real estate in its territories, and the
PLO charged for a range of administrative services and permits for business
activities.49 Diasporas also provided funding for the APPs, usually through
remittances and donations. The LF had ‘embassies’ abroad to raise money, and
the PLO taxed the income of Palestinians working in the Gulf. A significant
amount of money was raised this way, between tens of millions of dollars and $2
billion annually, contributing to a consumption economy.50
Illicit activities took advantage of the international economy. The LF allowed
Italian companies to dump radioactive waste for a fee, and a piracy scam was
quite profitable.51 Particularly at the start of the war, property was confiscated in
the downtown areas and the Beirut harbor looted. Banks were robbed, and
government and army property and artifacts from the National Museum were
stolen.52 Financial speculation continued to provide windfalls during the war.
Banks closely allied to Christian APPs failed, due probably to embezzling funds
channeled to an APP, and currency speculation benefited all the APPs as banks
collapsed and the Lebanese currency depreciated.53
The trajectory and priorities of governance institutions
Populations living in APP territory in Lebanon received varying amounts of
public services including security, welfare, social insurance, healthcare and
education, law and order, clean streets, public beaches, and even consumer
protection. Despite the wide range of ideologies and identities of the APPs, they
all converged in their institutional priorities, although not in their capacities or the
particular ways of achieving those priorities. Defying theories of path
dependency, these APPs departed radically from the Lebanese state’s example,
although often conforming to the organizational form of the Lebanese state. The
Lebanese state was noticeably lacking in the provision of law and order and
public welfare goods. Further, the APPs have usually been depicted sui generis,
as unique phenomena following historically distinct paths. Yet the ideologically
center-right Christian LF engaged in the same blanket services as the others, the
Druze socialist organization and the Palestinian developmentalist one. Under the
banner of Islam, Hezbollah now furnishes a similar set of services, albeit more
thoroughly and efficiently. Traveling through Lebanon in the 1990s, I heard the
strange statement in East Beirut that life had been better during the war. Given the
violence of the armed parties, this statement is senseless absent recognition of the
services provided by the APPs and not provided by the Lebanese state.54
After the consolidation of territory and homogenization of the population,
forcing minority populations out, the APPs settled into their separate areas. These



























social services developed only when territory and rule had been firmly
established.55 The consolidation of territory was an initial necessary but not
sufficient step in establishing governance and services. The priority of institutions
roughly corresponds to Rotberg’s hierarchy of political goods.56 The APPs
initially focused internally, on institutions dealing with their own fighters
including policing them and providing for their welfare. Fighters began as
volunteers, compensated for their services by economic opportunities afforded by
their coercive roles, namely, smuggling, looting, embezzling from trade and
duties, bribes, and ransoms. As the armed groups became more institutionalized,
regulating the fighters became a top priority not only to avoid alienating the
population but also to insure hierarchical command.57 To protect the populace
against its own members, regular salaries were paid to the fighters and a police
force was established to control the use of coercion. Health care and varying other
public goods including unemployment insurance, welfare, price regulation, and
employment for the rest of the populace in their territory followed. Policing and
social services for fighters provided the impetus for initial administrative
development, which soon expanded with the desire to spur the economy, regulate
civilian disputes, and secure revenue. Governing and cultural institutions were
next, institutions that were directed toward the ruled population in general and
not the soldiers.
While the first regularized institution for the APPs was policing their own
fighters, the second category of institutional creation was social services,
furnished first to fighters and their families. Many fighters were completely
dependent on the APP organization, particularly the large base of displaced or
refugees which feed the fighters’ ranks. Welfare and social services grew out of
the need to feed, care for, and house the fighters. In part, salary provision and
health care assured less graft and private use of force, fundamental to centralizing
coercive power. Such welfare, provided through military employment, was
extended to the families of fighters, particularly since many fighters’ families
were refugees. Welfare soon went beyond the immediate needs of war and spread
to responsibility for the populace’s welfare. Other public goods followed,
including provision of electricity and water. Alongside these social services came
fund-raising from the population. The APPs instituted taxation, customs duties,
fees, and initiated investment schemes and businesses themselves.
The next two categories of institutional creation were governance and cultural
institutions. Welfare and policing necessitated some administration, justice
institutions, and reach into the economy of the country. Revenue gathering also
pushed the institutionalization of governance and administration, as taxation
went hand in hand with regulation of the private sector and detailed databases of
business and revenue. Governance styles and institutions differed by the
ideological stance of the APP, its history, capacity, and relation with the
population.58 All held an idea of their ideal state prior to consolidating territory.
The LF and PSP delineated programs for social, education, and health issues




























Hezbollah took the Islamic Republic of Iran as its model. For those who derived
significant income from the populace, all save Hezbollah, their administrative
wings were pushed by revenue-gathering functions, taxation, customs, and
accounting in their new business ventures. Some generated additional institutions
in line with either their ideologies or the populace’s own efforts, in an attempt to
retain a monopoly of power.
Governance projects were capped off by attempts to create a culture for the
ethnic or religious group each represented. All engaged in the cultural production
of political identity typical of states and intended to create an emotional
attachment, including the rewriting of history textbooks, and the promotion of
songs, museums, and festivals binding the populace to the new political entity.60
These projects, which were elaborated and put into practice after the
consolidation of the other institutions delineated above, defined the APPs from
the outset and arguably set them off other actors that did not seek to generate
state-like institutions.61
The effects of all these institutions outlasted the institutions themselves. At a
minimum, the superior efficiency and provision of public goods discredited the
Lebanese state by comparison, according to observers. Even further, senses of
communal identity were solidified and new civil administration institutions
increased the autonomy of the cantons, and after the war, the separation of
religious confessions.62 In the following, I sketch the various types of institutions
created by the four armed groups.
Policing and law and order
The earliest institutions in the LF were established to prevent crime and examine
security concerns. This Joint Command Council later became a police force and
military court system in 1978.63 The LF also regulated traffic. In the PSP, leader
Kamal Junblatt (Druze) set up the Popular Administration in 1976 in response to
the flood of their allied LNM fighters into Druze territory. The local residents,
many of them Christian, turned to the Druze leader for protection against the
incoming fighters. The first priority for this Popular Administration was
investigating complaints against fighters, but it was further intended as a model
for organizing public services. After the end of the Popular Administration, with
the PSP leader’s death, a subsequent governing experiment, the Civil
Administration of the Mountain (CAOM), also prioritized policing. A police
force was established, regulating the activity of party members, quarrels between
residents, and complaints against businesses. Where party members were
concerned, punishment was quick.64
The PLO used the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command as a police force. It
then established a revolutionary court in 1972 to prosecute violations by armed
forces and serious crimes by the populace, and to mediate factional disputes. The
Popular Committees, composed of members of the various factions, acted like
municipality governments and handled lesser crimes and ordinary dispute



























mediation.65 Like the LF, they had a traffic police. Revolutionary courts
prosecuted criminals, but verdicts were affected by factional infighting.66 In
Hezbollah, the relatively higher pay scale reportedly made fighters less prone to
prey on the population, but the organization nevertheless established units to
monitor actions of party leaders. Like the other groups, a main job of Hezbollah
was mediation, or preventing intracommunal squabbles that threatened the social
order. The organization established a judicial system and mediation to deal with
the problem of blood feuds. In the event that mediation was unsuccessful,
solutions would be forcibly imposed on the parties to avoid vendettas escalating
into tit-for-tat murders. The organization mediated over 200 such feuds from its
establishment in the early to mid 1980s till the early 2000s, enacting
reconciliation rituals involving both parties and paying a handsome amount of the
compensation itself.67
Welfare and social services
The LF developed a large social service network, much of it on the backs of the
Popular Committees. The Popular Committees beganwith theKata’ib or Phalange
party (absorbed into the LF), and were continued in the LF. They were local
initiatives from the civilian chapters of the party to provide services to the
populace. The LF regularized and centralized these volunteer committees. Each
had 11 subcommittees in charge of a wide range of municipal duties from garbage
collection and health care to justice. By 1978 therewere 142 such committees.68 In
1977, the Popular Committees opened a Department of Consumer Protection,
checking meat, drugs, and foodstuffs. In 1987, the LF opened the Social Welfare
Agency to aid the needy. Basic goods like wheat were subsidized. With 35 branch
offices, the agency aided 25,000 families on a regular basis.69 Toward the end of
the war, popular displeasure and skyrocketing inflation resulted in the LF
attempting to improve its public image through increased social services.70 The LF
at this time had some 4000 civil servants in its employ.71
The range of service institutions established by the LF was broad. The LF
founded the National Solidarity Foundation, a social service institution furnishing
employment, low-cost housing, health care, and schooling assistance, among other
services. Numerous other organizations were founded and staffed by volunteers,
including the provision of psychological services for the young to deal with the
war. The Gamma group composed of businessmen and academics was established
with the goal of boosting the economy. The LF established summer camps for
children to escape the war, programs to combat drug use, emergency phone
centers, and establishments to treat emotional effects of the war, in addition to
public beaches, consumer protection agencies, and career guidance for youth.
Prices on goods were monitored to prevent over-pricing, and fuel stations were
inspected to ensure they delivered the advertised quality of fuel.72
For the PLO, the main services from the start revolved around caring for




























refugees. From the beginning of the war to 1982, the number cared for by the
PLO’s Social Affairs Department in Lebanon increased by nearly 20,000
families. Orphanages served around 850 children.73 PLO social institutions
concentrated on education and childcare, including extensive prenatal and
postnatal care, kindergartens, and orphanages. The group also had eight hospitals.
In education, programs included vocational and technical education, which
included women, summer camps, sports, and literacy drives. Dental care was also
provided. Prosthetic services were advanced to the degree that they were
manufactured in the camps.74 Significant benefits accrued to fighters and their
families, including trips abroad, university education, and housing. Pensions
were provided, as were funds for families of dead soldiers, and some for civilians
killed.75 Responsibility for infrastructure also fell to the PLO, including water,
electricity, garbage, and bomb shelters.
About two-thirds of the Palestinian labor force was employed in the PLO and
its institutions.76 The Palestine Martyrs Works Society (SAMED) ran industrial
and agricultural enterprises, producing a range of items from military uniforms to
toys, blankets, and handbags. Five thousand workers were employed in SAMED
factories, and six times more received training there. Even more worked on
experimental farms.77 Over 3000 employees were in social services, and a few
thousand more in the institutional administration of the PLO itself, in addition to
3000 or so paid military forces.78 All told, the organization employed some
10,000 in these non-military jobs directly, and reportedly three times that amount
indirectly.79
For the Druze PSP, social services institutions began with help for
individuals’ housing and community-based volunteer food provision for the
fighters.80 Care for the dependents of the fighters followed. The civilian
administration or CAOM’s Education Committee supplemented teachers’
salaries and provided transport. Parents mobilized to monitor education and
fees, which were decided in association with the parent committees. Basic
services and education counted at slightly below half of the administration’s
budget. The administration employed a few thousand individuals in the middle of
the 1980s, and provided loans, monthly aid, scholarships, and stipends to
martyrs’ families.81 To bolster the economy in its territory, the PSP attempted to
aid production and build industry, although the area had not been an industrial
one before the war. This generated new industrialists.82 Over 100 industrial firms
were established, 29 of which employed more than 25 workers. A total of almost
2000 workers were employed, amounting to almost half of the industrial working
class in that region. All told, the PSP employed 15,000–16,000 in its various
companies and the administration. In addition to industry, the PSP invested in
agriculture including a banana farm in the area of Damour, real estate, and a retail
and household goods store chain.83
Hezbollah’s social service network is vast; the organization is well known for
its provision of welfare. Much of this was spurred by destruction from wars. The
party provided basic services, including sewage, water, and electricity. The main



























institutions furnishing aid were the Social Services Unit, the Reconstruction
Campaign (Jihad al-Bina’), and the Islamic Health Organization. The
Reconstruction Campaign rebuilt almost 11,000 institutions including homes,
schools, and hospitals, and constructed 78 more anew as of the early 2000s.84 The
Health Units of the Islamic Health Organization benefited an average of 400,000
yearly. Medical visits and tests were discounted, and patient bills subsidized. The
Educational Unit provided financial aid, furnishing an average of about $3.3
million annually.85 Agricultural centers provided aid to farmers and veterinary
services in the underserved rural areas. In 1992, Hezbollah established a free
transport system, restaurants with free meals for the poor, low-price
supermarkets, pharmacies, and clinics.86 The party has supplied about 7500
small loans a year, more than any other NGO in Lebanon.87 In 1987, Hezbollah
provided 80,000 student grants, aided martyrs’ families, and furnished health and
other aid worth $12 million per month.88 Institutions are split, with one type
providing aid to the armed section of the political party and the other for the
population generally.89
The 2006 Israel–Hezbollah June war spurred even more rebuilding.
Hezbollah’s Reconstruction Campaign and its newly established Wa’ad
(Promise) organization rebuilt urban areas and apartments in southern Beirut
(the Dahiyya or suburb), reportedly distributing $300 million for immediate aid
following the 2006 war, to individuals from the various Lebanese sects. For
various reasons, the state was a minor player in this reconstruction.90
Expanding administration and governance
Institutionalization and bureaucratization of policing and social services
expanded the reach and potential authority of the armed groups. Both through
these institutions and the search for control and revenue, groups administered and
governed their populations according to their various ideologies. The relations
between the ruled and the armed groups were not democratic; popular
involvement and influence occurred either through broad public opinion shifts,
individuals with connections, or membership in the political party.
The institutionalization of the LF was reflected in their change of slogan,
from al-quwwat muqawama (the forces are a resistance) to al-quwwat
mu’assassa (the forces are an institution).91 The LF founded the Delta group,
an information technology section dedicated to managing their data. This
included a detailed listing of all property and businesses under the group’s control
along with the estimated earnings.92 The Gamma group, composed of technical
experts, academics, and businessmen, was charged with reconstructing
infrastructure, agriculture, and industry. The LF also had missions or ‘embassies’
overseas, in charge of fund-raising, dealing with expatriate Lebanese Christians,
and spreading the organization’s point of view.
Like the LF, the PLO institutionalized its rule, becoming even more similar to




























popular committees, composed of faction representatives. Numerous and
overlapping administrations were established by the factions, which generated
competition, multiple services, and institutions for similar functions, and conflict
over legitimate authority. These popular organizations, similar to the Arab
socialist style, incorporated the populace through profession or life character-
istics, such as teachers and professional unions, scout groups for children, and
women’s groups.94
The PSP relied for much of the war on its own party offices mediating with
the populace, who organized informally. Like the other groups, the PSP became
increasingly institutionalized, albeit on a smaller scale than the others. The PSP
remained the least centralized of all the armed groups analyzed here, relying upon
a decentralized system of existing notables and community officials for justice.
Nevertheless, CAOM services spread into consumer protection, examining issues
of building codes and expired medicines. Their infrastructure undertakings
included repairing and building new schools. The CAOM worked with
international and national agencies such as the Council for Development and
Reconstruction in Lebanon and Save the Children in this endeavor. They repaired
homes and convinced state employees to work for them for additional pay.
Telephone employees used CAOM equipment and transport, and CAOM
purchased the required inputs. World Vision International helped finance a dairy
farm, providing the expertise and one-fifth of the capital. The Italians aided in an
experimental farm.95
Like the LF, Hezbollah relied on a combination of new social groups, who
were already organizing on their own to provide social services, and also created
its own connections with society like the PLO. Unlike the PSP, Hezbollah
eschewed dealing with traditional notables and in fact arose partly in opposition
to those existing rulers. Hezbollah began by incorporating existing NGOs and
civil society social service organizations, all operating within an Islamic
framework, into an umbrella network. Adding to this tapped reserve of popular
effort, it organized its own party and armed departments, and through these it
dealt with the population. The organization is decentralized, more like the LF
than the PLO, but still highly regulated.96 It spread into community governance
even after the war, and received a United Nations best practices award for its
participatory and community development in one municipality within its
suburb.97
Culture and identity
Spreading their own viewpoint was central to the APPs, and they used the media
to achieve a mass effect. Private media exploded during the civil war, with about
50 television stations operating unofficially and even more radio stations.98 The
smaller component groups of the umbrella groups had their own stations. The LF
had the Radio of Free Lebanon; the Kata’ib had the Voice of Lebanon.99 The LF
Information Department also ran a weekly paper and the Lebanese Broadcasting



























Company, which continued after the war to become the most popular station in
the country, with over two-thirds of the audience, and one of the top Arab stations
internationally.100The PSP’s radio was Sawt al-Jabal (Voice of the Mountain).101
The PLO had a radio station, a daily paper, and magazines.102 Hezbollah created
radio stations, the Voice of the Dispossessed in 1986 in the Beqaa, the Voice of
Faith in Beirut in 1987, and later a television station, al-Manar, which has been
the subject of much international controversy.103
Identity projects were at the center of these activities. The Lebanese Front titled
one of its first documents ‘the Lebanon we want to build’.104 A ‘Phoenician’
ideology was promoted by the LF, arguing for the essential difference of Lebanese
Christians as non-Arabs, and their constitution as a distinct nation. Intellectuals and
the clergy were main promoters of these views, creating journals dedicated to
Phoenician history that continued after the war.105 Identity programs extended
abroad, for emigrant Lebanese children to learn their heritage through visits to
Lebanon.106 ThePLOwanted to create a truly Palestinian national identity among its
people. The PLO funded the arts, theater, and traditional crafts. These include the
Cinema Production Sector, and Theater andArt troopswhich toured internationally.
Holidays and celebrations focused on the abstract nation, celebrating Land Day,
important battles, thefightwith the Jordanian regime, and soon. Streets that hadbeen
named after the inhabitants’ village of origin were altered to indicate the political
faction of the PLO operating there, such as Iqleem Fatah (Fatah) or Maktab Siyasi
(PFLP).107 The new identity could include alterations in personal life. Many PLO
factions prohibitedpolygamyand actively supportedwomen’s ability to choose their
marriagepartners, interveningagainstmale relatives.108 In theDruze region, thePSP
wanted to create a socialist individual. The new PSP flag took the place of the
Lebanese one, and the organization also had its own anthem.109 Cultural promotion
extended to museums. Beiteddine museum was renovated, and an historic town
rebuilt. Anothermuseum’s construction began in 1990 (Baalbek).110 Hezbollahwas
likewise engaged in a re-creation of the individual, through espousing authenticated
religious practices and encouraging both a resistance society and pride, against a
background of historical disadvantage.111 Socially, a hala islamiyya or Islamic
condition, was promoted including spaces of approved recreation for youth,112 and
new museums in the south and Beqaa Valley in the 2000s.
Education was central to these efforts. The PSP utilized the public school
system but altered the content. Their administration, the CAOM, revised and
published history books for the schools under its jurisdiction. New history texts
(al-Tarikh) and civics books (al-Tanshi’a al-wataniyya) were prepared for all
grades (first through university) to replace the Ministry of Education’s texts.
These de-emphasized the Phoenician history that the Christians emphasized and
expanded attention to the Druze. The books treated Lebanon as one area within
greater Syria. They emphasized socialist values, sacrifice for the country, and
scouting. High school military training texts were also provided.113
New texts were likewise produced in the Palestinian areas. PLO schools used




























historical education. Tarikh al-Falasteen, History of Palestine, was a three-
volume scholarly work produced by a Palestinian research organization.114
Hezbollah was very active in research institutions and schooling. Its Institution of
Islamic Education and Socialization began in 1993, and includes at least 14
schools.115 Likewise, the organization began a research center, the Consultative
Centre for Studies and Documentation in 1988, publishing a wide array of articles
and reports.116
Lebanon case conclusions
The conclusions derived from the current – albeit limited – comparison point to
several factors involved in the generation of public institutions in areas controlled
by such APPs. The overarching rationale of control combined with popular
models of legitimate government held by the population and espoused by the
political parties themselves, backed up by citizen efforts to provide social
services and potentially compete with the APP.
Despite the diverse ideologies, resources, backgrounds, and national identity
conceptions of these APPs, similar types of institutions were established in the
same order of priority. These similarities provide initial insight into the priorities
of APPs who have governing projects. In the Lebanese APPs, policing
institutions developed first, with the goal of regulating the behavior of fighters
themselves. While protection and security are fundamental political goods, they
are double-edged. An asymmetry of power characterizes the purveyors and
purchasers of protection. Specialists in coercion are themselves the chief, but not
sole, threat to which they offer a solution – what is known as the protection
racket. Internally, the APPs needed to prevent factions within the ranks in
addition to not grossly offending the populace. Further, these institutions can
maintain uncontested power by avoiding common social and neighborhood
conflicts that escalate into violence outside the purview of the APP.
Policing was closely followed by social services, again first for the fighters.
Basic policing of the fighters later developed into governing institutions of
dispute settlement, courts, and regulatory institutions. The particular institutions
that began with the priority of maintaining the fighters and keeping them from
committing random acts of violence against the ruled population expanded to
institutions of governance and social welfare for the general populace.
Educational, cultural, and media institutions to promote a distinct and proud
identity were last. Although these cultural institutions were present from the
beginning, they were not the focus of investment by the APPs until policing and
social welfare were secured.
Scholars and interviewees in Lebanon often posit that a vacuum of
governance and services caused the establishment of APP public goods
institutions. Social services were needed to prevent problems due to both state
collapse and migration into APP areas in Lebanon, Harik states. The amount of
need and devastation seem to matter. The PSP coordinated aid between its party



























offices and individuals helping the refugees and needy in their area, from 1976 to
1983. The subsequent war with the LF on PSP territory caused large devastation
and entailed more systematic and centralized coordination for PSP relief
efforts.117 Similarly, the PLO was solely responsible for caring for the
Palestinians in Lebanon, as the state provided nothing and most employment was
closed to Palestinians. The PLO indeed was well organized administratively.
PLO provisioning included infrastructure, the lack of which also spurred the
organization of Hezbollah in the southern Beirut suburbs due to neglect of the
state and destruction from the 1982 Israeli invasion. Yet popular need in other
areas has not been sufficient to cause the founding of public service institutions.
In Africa, extreme devastation generated no collective goods institutions for the
populace in areas controlled by violent non-state actors. In Lebanon currently, a
lack of such institutions continues and the state makes no attempt to fill this
gap. A lack of security may differ from a vacuum of public services, as the
absence of law and order allows armed groups to extend their control. In Iraq, the
APPs reportedly filled the ‘security gap’.118
Instead of sheer need, the desire for complete military control is a more
plausible explanation. Data from interviews and the actions of the Lebanese
APPs suggest a combination of ideology and desire for control is causal in
generating public institutions. Control is enhanced by some of the APP’s public
services, as these services have direct military implications. Services can play a
controlling and security role.119 Policing institutions not only aid monopolistic
control within a territory but also maintain the military hierarchy within the APP.
But control is also multifaceted, and encompasses a role for civil society activism
and a desire for legitimacy. The APP’s goal for monopolistic power suggests that
potential competition from other actors, violent or not, would spur a desire to
eliminate any alternative potential allegiances. The APP would thus furnish the
institutions or services itself, incorporating and regulating the other actors. These
Lebanese APPs absorbed or co-opted popular social service efforts, and either
subsumed or fought APPs competing for governance in their territory. Such a
dynamic generates the hypothesis that more active civil societies, or those with
the capability of mobilizing, who have clear preferences as is the case in
Lebanon, would generate more public goods provision from APPs.
The role of resources derived from the population is ambiguous. Popular
resources through taxation played a role in some Lebanese APPs more than
others. The prominent role of domestic financial sources in the Lebanese civil
war, including transit fees and taxation, could support the thesis that non-lootable
resources generate more attention to popular needs in APP governance. The LF,
for example, taxed internal trade more than external trade. Yet Hezbollah from
the beginning of the war received, and continues to receive, significant external
resources. While the group did not need contributions from the population, this
lack of need did not translate into fewer public service institutions. To the
contrary, this group has one of the most extensive networks of social services of




























continued to play a role, and as external funding declined after the end of the war,
the group has broadened and softened its ideological stance to include, or at least
not offend, wider segments of the population. Lack of taxation or resources raised
from the population does not indicate that a violent non-state actor would neither
need nor desire legitimacy, but a large role for such popular resources may
require at least minimal popular approval.120
The Lebanese APPs had developed ideological ideas to care for the populace,
justified by rejection of the national model of non-provision of services.121 This
fact also separates the Lebanese APPs from many predatory violent non-state
actors. They were not attempting to take the money and run, but to rule over their
areas by enacting their existing ideology. These APPs were ideological parties
before they were APPs, or the APPs developed alongside the political party. They
had in mind models of the state they wanted to build, and detailed plans for social
and economic institutions were present in their earliest writings.122 The populace
was active in the political parties and popular movements from which the APPs
sprung. Civil society itself was a mainstay of the new administrations:
volunteerism was channeled and formed the basic infrastructure for much of the
services. Citizens organizing to provide public goods for themselves elicited a
response from the rulers, due to desires for legitimacy and the search for complete
military control. Lebanese citizens had high expectations and well-developed
conceptions of what they desired of their new government. It bears repeating that
positing such a role for popular expectations does not suggest that the APPs were
democratic or promoted civil rights and representation. The populace was heavily
repressed and thought was policed, a dynamic uniform across the divergent
ideologies and APP political parties.
Conclusion: Governance and institutions of violent non-state actors
Increasing numbers of people in failed or weak states are under the rule of non-
state actors, yet we know little about the incentives and pressures they face apart
from violent and economic considerations. In some cases, a desire to govern and
win the populace’s approval is a motivating factor for non-state actors. In contrast
to the old idea of a fixed national state fighting an insurgent group whose aim is
control of that national state, violent non-state actors can have little aspiration to
control or even interact with the national state. Instead, they can establish
alternative governing bodies on the territory they rule. Increasingly, non-state
actors coexist with a state that has no ability to enforce its law and order functions
on the non-state actor.
The institutions non-state governing actors create hold important con-
sequences not only for those they rule, but also for the legitimacy of the national
state and attempts at disarmament, stabilization, and reconstruction. This study
represents a first cut into that analysis. A comparison of institutional paths of the
Lebanese APPs permits analysis of their common trajectories within a single
domestic context and culture. Across ideologies, the similar categories of



























priorities are a strong indicator of the important role these institutions play. All
the APPs departed from the Lebanese state’s night-watchman character and
provided sophisticated social services to the populations under their control. The
breath of institutions established demonstrates an alternative model of
governance from the existing one of minimal government. To some extent, the
results aligned with the various ideologies of the APPs. To a greater extent, the
services provided by APPs converged on the common basics of policing and
welfare, which together maintained their right to rule. The importance of the
internal needs of the APP for hierarchy and control is suggested by the similar
pattern of institution-building that began with attempts to regulate the behavior of
fighters themselves. Citizen activism partly spurred APP efforts to control and
regulate their activities, absorbing and providing those services in the process.
The new institutions were a mix of innovation inspired by military desires for
control, political ideals, and popular initiatives. In turn, such public institutions
and social service provision can decrease the legitimacy of the national
government, where it still exists, and can solidify the APP’s separatist project
over the long-term.123
Disclaimer
The views expressed here are the author’s and not those of any institutional
affiliation.
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population should in no way detract from the coercive and repressive actions of
these groups.
8. The numerous terms for violent non-state actors are confused, but a full accounting
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other Christian APPs by 1980. The LF shared the ideological outlook of the Kata’ib.
On the early Kata’ib, see Stoakes, ‘The Supervigilantes’.
37. Personal Communication, Independent researcher and former educator in PLO
institutions.
38. Harik, Public and Social Services, 15. Its leader was also assassinated, and
leadership passed to his son. The father, Kamal Junblatt, held strong socialist
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